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SIXTY-FIFTH HONOR LECTURE
DELIVERED AT THE UNIVERSITY
A basic objective of the Faculty Association of Utah State University, in the words of its constitution, is:
to encourage intellectual growth and development of its members
by sponsoring and arranging for the publication of two annual
faculty research lectures in the fields of (1) the biological and
exact sciences, including engineering, called the Annual Faculty
Honor Lecture in the Natural Sciences; and (2) the humanities
and social sciences, including education and business administration, called the Annual Faculty Honor Lecture in the Humanities.

The administration of the University is sympathetic with these
aims and shares, through the Scholarly Publications Committee, the
costs of publishing and distributing these lectures.
Lecturers are chosen by a standing committee of the Faculty
Association. Among the factors considered by the committee in choosing lecturers, are in the words of the constitution:
(1) creative activity in the field of the proposed lecture; (2)
publication of research through recognized channels in the field
of the proposed lecture; (3) outstanding teaching over an
extended period of years ; (4) personal influence in developing the
character of the students.

E.A . McCullough, Jr. , was selected by the committee to deliver
the Annual Faculty Honor Lecture in the Sciences. On behalf of the
members of the Association we are happy to present Professor McCullough's paper.

Committee on Faculty Honor Lecture

Theory and Intuition
by
E. A. McCullough, Jr.

65th Faculty Honor Lecture
Utah State University
Logan. Utah

Theory and Intuition
by
E. A. McCullough, Jr. *
Among the practitioners of science are people who are called
theorists , and this lecture is concerned with the question, Just what is it
that a theorist does?
If an experimentalist does experiments, then a theorist
presumably does theories. What is a theory? My dictionary defines it as
". . . a system of assumptions, accepted principles, or rules of pro·
cedure devised to analyze, predict or otherwise explain the nature or
behavior of a specified set of phenomena."1
Those who now understand perfectly what a theorist does may
stop reading here because everything that follows will be superfluous.
For those who are still somewhat in the dark, the rest of this lecture
will attempt to explain, in rather more concrete terms, just what it
means to be a theorist. Of course, I cannot presume to speak for all
theorists; therefore, I am going to discuss only what it means to be a
theorist within the context of my own specialty, theoretical chemistry.
Since I occasionally encounter people who seem to feel that
"theoretical" is synonymous with "lacking any practical utility," I also
want to indicate why such is not the case, at least for theoretical
chemistry. To put it another way, I hope to correct the misperception
about theorists perhaps best expressed by my mother when she
exclaimed, "You mean you get paid to do that?"
What does it mean to do theoretical chemistry? Let me begin by
sketching very roughly what chemistry is. Science has been divided
• Associate Professor, Department of Chemistry and Biochemistry, Utah State
University.
Scientific research is rarely an individual effort; it generally requires both help
and money. It has been my privilege to collaborate with two very fine scientists and
very fine people as well. They are Dr. Ludwik Adamowicz, a citizen of Poland , and
Dr. Phillip A . Christiansen, now at Potsdam , New York. Financial assistance has been
provided by the Utah State University Office of Research and the National Science
Foundation .
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into a number of subdisciplines: physics, chemistry, biology, etc. The
boundaries between subdisciplines are somewhat arbitrary and often
fuzzy , yet one can usually recognize the subdisciplines by the basic
assumptions they employ and the phenomena they admit for consideration.
The principal axiom of chemistry is the atomic hypothesis:
(1) most of the material contents of the universe are composed of very
tiny entities called atoms ; (2) each atom consists of a certain number
of negatively charged electrons moving about a positively charged
nucleus ; and (3) although there are approximately one hundred fundamentally different kinds of atoms, they can combine with each
other to form molecules in an enormous number of ways. The interpretation of natural phenomena in terms of atoms and molecules
essentially defines the subdiscipline of chemistry.
To clarify what chemistry is, it may be helpful to consider some
examples of what it isn't. At the one extreme, any phenomenon whose
interpretation depends on knowing what an electron is, or on knowing
what a nucleus is made of, isn't chemistry. All we need for chemistry
are a few properties of electrons and nuclei. 2 Questions about why they
have these properties are not chemical questions, not because they are
uninteresting, but because they are unnecessary for chemistry.
Instead, such questions belong in another subdiscipline, physics.
At the other extreme, consider biology. Biologists made considerable progress without ever having to invoke the assumption that
living things were made of atoms. For example, the principles of
genetics were worked out without this assumption. However, this
example also illustrates the arbitrariness of dividing science into subdisciplines because we have since discovered an atomic interpretation
of genetics in terms of the molecular structure of DNA. In fact, the
atomic interpretation of biology has become so prevalent and fruitful
that it has spawned a whole new subdiscipline, biochemistry.
Having more or less established the definitional boundaries of
chemistry, we can proceed to theoretical chemistry. In defining
theory, I wish to adopt the following abbreviated but much sharper
version of the dictionary definition quoted earlier: A theory is a system
of rules for predicting the behavior of a specified set of phenomena. If
the specified phenomena belong to the subdiscipline of chemistry, we
have a theory of chemistry. The choice of "predict" rather than
2

"explain" is very important. A rule that can explain but cannot
predict is not really a theory in the scientific sense.
In many contexts, the term rules carries absolutist or dogmatic
connotations, but such connotations are definitely not intended in
scientific usage. Indeed, the one absolute in science is that there are no
absolutes. The scientific "truth" of any theory is determined solely by
the agreement between the predictions of the theory and experimental
observations. This appeal to experimental evidence is precisely what
distinguishes scientific truth from many other kinds of truth.
Therefore, the term rules should be read as "instructions" or even as
"recipe. "
The strength of any theory is measured by testing the scope and
the precision of its predictions. The latter test means that ultimately
we are seeking rules that predict the behavior of phenomena quantitatively. Mathematics is our most useful language for expressing
quantitative statements precisely and concisely. Consequently, our
strongest theories are expressed often most simply in mathematical
terms. The converse isn't necessarily true, of course. The mere fact
that a theory can be expressed mathematically doesn't make the
theory strong. This fact is easy to forget in an era of computers. A
computer certainly can be used to derive the predictions of any theory
if the rules of the theory can be expressed in a suitable mathematical
form. Once the rules have been programmed into the computer, the
computer usually can derive the predictions much faster and more
reliably than could any human. This use of computers is indispensable
in many areas of theoretical research - theoretical chemistry,
especially - but it does nothing to increase the validity of the theory.
As the computer scientist Joseph Weizenbaum has remarked, " If
astrology is nonsense, then computerized astrology is just as surely
nonsense. " 3
I now wish to address the question, What does it mean to be a
theorist? If a theory is a set of rules for predicting the behavior of a
specified set of phenomena, ostensibly the fundamental problem for
theorists is to discover what are the rules. This is indeed the fundamental problem; but, surprisingly, it is not the task that occupies
most theorists, and certainly not theoretical chemists. In fact,
theoretical chemists never have to confront this problem, for the simple reason that the rules of chemistry are already knownl
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Astonishing as it may seem, this statement is absolutely correct, as
far as we know. To have the rules of chemistry means to have the rules
for the behavior of atoms and molecules, and we believe we have those
rules. Furthermore, these same rules must be applicable to the
behavior of any phenomenon that can be reduced to the behavior of
atoms and molecules, which is almost everything from atoms on up. It
certainly includes those phenomena comprising the subdisciplines of
chemistry, biology, geology, and most of astronomy and physics as
well.
Two questions come to mind immediately. First, do we have the
rules for everything? The answer is no. For example, we have no
theory that predicts all the properties of an electron. (There are many
other examples.) Discovering the rules for these phenomena is the task
a very small group of theorists have set for themselves. They are
theoretical physicists working at the frontiers of fundamental physics.
These pioneers are by and large regarded as the superstars by other
theorists. In a very real sense, they create the world we live in.
The second question is, Why are there any other theorists? If we
have the complete rules of chemistry, why do we need theoretical
chemists? Indeed, why do we need any chemists at all? A complete
theory of chemistry can predict the outcome of any chemical reaction.
Of course, it may still be desirable to carry out selected chemical reactions in order to manufacture something useful, but that activity is the
domain of chemical engineering. There is certainly no reason to carry
out a chemical reaction in order to learn something new, for if we
already have the rules, there is nothing new to be learned.
Although this view is actually held by some people, it is, at best,
hopelessly simplistic. The reason is expressed very clearly by the
theoretical physicist R. P. Feynman in his classic introductory physics
text.' We may, says Feynman, draw an analogy between the natural
world and a game of chess. Scientific theories are then analogous to
the rules of chess and working out the predictions of the theories corresponds to playing the game. But there is a very big difference
between knowing the rules of chess and being able to play. So it is with
chemistry. We know the rules, but we cannot play very well. Why?
The theoretical physicist P .A.M . Dirac, who codiscovered the rules of
chemistry, explained it this way:
The underlying physical laws necessary for the mathematical
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theory of a large part of physics and the whole of chemistry are
thus completely known, and the difficulty is only that the exact
application of these laws leads to equations much too complicated
to be soluble. s

In other words, we don't understand what the rules are telling us.
Trying to understand what the rules are telling us is the principal
task of the vast majority of theorists. I consider this task to be interesting, challenging, and important, and I would like to devote the rest
of this lecture to describing how we go about it in the particular case of
theoretical chemistry.
We first need to know, what are the rules of chemistry. Actually,
there are two complementary sets of rules of roughly equal importance. Understanding what either set is telling us is sufficiently difficult that a theoretical chemist will often specialize in one set or the
other.
The first set contains the rules for predicting the behavior of an
individual molecule, given that it consists of so many electrons and
nuclei with such and such properties (atoms are just special cases of
molecules). These rules are known as quantum mechanics, and the
application of them to chemistry is usually termed quantum
chemistry.
It may not be readily apparent why we need any rules of
chemistry other than quantum mechanics. The reason has to do with
statistics. Almost any chemical phenomenon of interest will involve
contributions from the individual behavior of enormous numbers of
molecules, of the order of a billion-billion (10 18 ), at least. The
behavior of any particular molecule at any particular time may vary
over a wide range; but we don't really care, for most purposes, what
each molecule is doing. Usually, we are only interested in the average
behavior of all of them at once. The rules for inferring this average
behavior from the spectrum of behavior of an individual molecule are
called, appropriately enough, statistical mechanics.
Both quantum mechanics and statistical mechanics are relatively
recent discoveries. Statistical mechanics dates from approximately the
middle of the nineteenth century. Quantum mechanics is a child of
the twentieth century but only barely. Born in 1900, it reached essentially full maturity as the theory of atoms and molecules between 1925
and 1929.
5

It is remarkable that the correct rules for predicting the average
behavior of large numbers of molecules (statistical mechanics) were
discovered before the correct rules for predicting the behavior of an
individual molecule (quantum mechanics) . How was that possible?
The answer is that prior to the discovery of quantum mechanics,
theoriests believed that they already had the correct rules for predicting the behavior of an individual molecule. These rules were Newtonian mechanics, which were laid down by Isaac Newton in 1687 and
refined over the next two centuries into an elegant and all-powerful
theory. In every case where these rules had been applied, they had
worked perfectly; they correctly predicted the behavior of everything
from billiard balls to planets. There was no reason to expect that they
would not work just as well for molecules; but when the application to
molecules was attempted, the predictions turned out to be wrong.
The first evidence that classical mechanics (as Newtonian
mechanics is now called) was incorrect on the atomic scale was
obtained by using statistical mechanics to predict the average behavior
of a large number of molecules which individually obeyed classical
mechanics. Initially, the predictions worked pretty well, which
inspired confidence not only in statistical mechanics but also in the
atomic hypothesis. Yes, incredible as it seems to a modern chemist, as
late as 1900 there were still eminent chemists who argued that
although atoms and molecules were useful mental models, they were
not real. In fact statistical mechanics was largely responsible for
demolishing this viewpoint by showing that literal acceptance of the
atomic hypothesis allowed one to predict observable large scale properties of matter. Unfortunately, the developers of statistical
mechanics 6 didn't know when to quit. As they pushed their predictions
further , the agreement between theory and experiment seemed to get
worse. It gradually became apparent that the atomic hypothesis,
classical mechanics, and statistical mechanics were mutually incompatible.
In 1900, Max Planck demonstrated that the trouble lay with
classical mechanics, 7 the last place a nineteenth-century physicist
would have suspected. Planck's revolutionary discovery that the
Newtonian rules simply didn't work for atoms and molecules marked
the dawn of quantum mechanics. For the next three decades, theorists
searched frantically for the new rules. It all came together between
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1925 and 1929 . A particularly crucial event for chemistry occurred in
1926. In that year, Erwin Schrodinger published a series of papers setting out the fundamental new rules for predicting the behavior of
atoms and molecules. 8 In essence, his rules can be reduced to the
single statement

A'V = ~ a'V
2n

at

which is called the time-dependent Schrodinger equation .
Before my physicist colleagues jump all over me, I should hasten
to add that the Schrodinger equation cannot really predict all
behavior of atoms and molecules,9 but it is certainly good enough for
most chemical purposes. In particular, it can account for chemical
bonding with a very high degree of accuracy.
As a theoretical chemist specializing in quantum mechanics, my
job is trying to understand what the Schrodinger equation is telling us.
You may find it difficult to believe that one fairly simple looking equation could tell us anything useful, much less contain all of chemistry.
The apparent simplicity, however, is due to our having cast the equation into a particular mathematical form specially chosen to make it
look simple. Before considering in detail the application of this equation to chemistry, we should pause to examine the new and strange
worldview that quantum mechanics employs.
Whenever new rules of nature have been discovered, they have
often required profound revisions in our way of looking at things. This
is especially true with quantum mechanics. The revisions it requires
might be divided into two classes: revisions of intuition and revisions of
philosophy.
Revisions of intuition are necessary because the predictions of
quantum mechanics often clash violently with our intuitive expectations about the behavior of things. This is clearly illustrated by the socalled wave-particle duality. At the fundamental level, classical
physics recognized only two mutually exclusive categories of
phenomena: waves and particles. For instance, an electron was a particle, whereas light was a wave. According to quantum mechanics,
however, what we normally think of as a particle may sometimes act
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like a wave and vice versa. Despite how bizarre and counterintuitive
this seems to us, it is absolutely correct. Experiments exhibiting wave
phenomena (interference, diffraction) are routinely performed with
electrons, and a sensitive photocell can record the arrival of individual
particles of light (photons) . Since the predictions of quantum
mechanics are in accord with experiment while our intuition is not, it
is our intuition that must be revised. The problem with our intuition is
that it is basically Newtonian because the rules of quantum mechanics
reduce to the rules of Newtonia,n mechanics in the large-scale world of
our everyday experience. We have no direct experience of the world of
electrons, and when we extrapolate our Newtonian intuition to that
level, it fails. We simply must accept revisions of our intuition if we
hope to deal with the physical world.
Revisions of philosophy present quite a different problem . The
philosophical interpretation of quantum mechanics still provokes
fierce debate . In this lecture, I don't wish to embark on a discussion of
the philosophy of quantum mechanics. Many excellent books have
been written on the subject. 10 I only wish to point out that our current,
most widely accepted interpretation places stringent limitations on
what we can possibly know about the world. In particular, the most we
can know about any event is the probability, or chance, that it will
happen. This limitation does not arise from incomplete information;
the probability is the complete information. Obviously, this point of
view represents a far cry from the deterministic certainty of Newtonian
mechanics, and the philosophical implications are, to say the least,
disquieting.
Some people find the implications so disquieting that they cannot
accept them. This list has included some famous scientists-Albert
Einstein, for one. Although admitting that quantum mechanics was
eminently successful in predicting the probabilities of events, Einstein
could never accept that probabilities were the most that could be
known about nature. He believed that quantum mechanics was only
the shadow of some more complete, as-yet-undiscovered theory.
Other people have gone in the opposite direction. Unable to
accept an interpretation of quantum mechanics that asserts that
natural events are inherently chancelike, they have been led to reject
quantum mechanics altogether. I show part of an advertisement from
a recent issue of Scientific American. 11
8

T heJournal of Classical Physics
This new journal is intended for Scientists and knowledgeable
laypersons who feel Quantum Wave Mechanics is non-predictive
and ultimately counterproductive and that classical model
development is preferred.

The assertion that quantum mechanics is "non-predictive" is simply
wrong if the intended sense is "cannot predict the observable results of
experiments." The predictions may be strange and the philosophical
implications unpalatable, but quantum mechanics works extremely
well, and it has no competitors in this regard.
The Schrodinger equation supplies the machinery for making the
predictions of quantum mechanics known to us. These predictions
take the form of probabilities, the chance that an event of interest will
occur. This probability information is contained in IJI (Greek psi, pronounced "sigh"), which is called the wavefunctz·on. For a molecule, IJI
could tell us the probability of finding the electrons arranged in a certain pattern about the nuclei at a certain time . Note that IJI does not
tell us that we w£il find the electrons arranged in that way, only the
chance that we will. This information is sufficient, because given the
probabilities of all possible arrangements of electrons and nuclei , we
can calculate any measurable property of the molecule-the energy,
for example. So IJI is the answer, the output.
What is the input? What determines whether we get the
wavefunction for methane or ethane? We supply that information in
the form of
which is called the ham£ltonz'an operator, a hamiltonian for short. Methane and ethane differ because the hamiltonians
for the two molecules differ.
What is a hamiltonian? Unfortunately, there is no way to answer
that question in a lecture like this. The best I can do is show one. This
is the hamiltonian for the relatively simple molecule, diatomic
hydrogen, H 2 •

A,

A

H

122
122
= - --(
'i7 +v ) - -( V +v )2MH

a

b

2

1

2

1
1
- -1 - -1- - 1+ -1+ -

ral

ra2

rbl

rb2

r12

rab

Plug this hamiltonian into the Schrodinger equation, solve for IJI, and
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you have the complete story on H 2 , according to quantum
mechanics.12 The complexity of this hamiltonian illustrates that the
apparent simplicity of the Schrodinger equation is deceptive. The
equation is really far more complicated than it looks when written in
the simple mathematical form presented earlier.
It is, in fact, so complicated that we are unable to solve it exactly
in nearly every case. We can only solve it exactly for one molecule. We
can't even solve it exactly for any atoms except hydrogen. It may seem
rather pretentious to claim that an equation that can be solved exactly
only for one atom and one molecule contains all chemistry. How can
we be so certain it is correct?
There are several pieces of evidence. First, there are those few
cases where we can obtain exact solutions. In these cases, the agreement with experiment is spectacular. For example, the Schrodinger
equation predicts the wavelengths at which the hydrogen atom
absorbs light to an accuracy of about one part in one hundred thou·
sand. That a natural phenomenon could be described so precisely by a
formal mathematical equation so surprised the mathematician
Stanislaw M. Ulam that he questioned the physicist Enrico Fermi
about it. Fermi replied, "It has no business being that good, you know
Stan ."13 We believe in the Schrodinger equation because we don't
believe that this level of accuracy can be accidental. (Incidentally,
classical mechanics gives hopelessly incorrect predictions for the
hydrogen atom.)
A second reason for having faith in the Schrodinger equation is
that even a rudimentary understanding of what it is telling us may
lead to a sudden unification-one fundamental, beautifully simple
interpretation of a whole set of previously incomprehensible
phenomena. A classic chemical example of such a unification involved
what Sherlock Holmes might have called The Case of the Aromatic
Sextet.
The Aromatic Sextet is not a musical group, but rather a term
coined by chemists in prequantum-mechanics days. It refers to the
unusual stability displayed by monocyclic polyenes with six pi electrons. In order to explain this phenomenon, I shall have to introduce
just a bit of organic chemistry.
Chemists have long appreciated the unique ability of the carbon
atom to form up to four covalent bonds. Well before the advent of
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quantum mechanics, chemists also began to suspect that a covalent
bond between two atoms involved a shared pair of electrons, one electron being donated by each atom. Thus, carbon must have four electrons readily available to form covalent bonds.
Suppose we take a carbon atom and bond it to a hydrogen atom,
leaving the carbon with a residual bonding power of three. Then suppose we take a number of these carbon-hydrogen units and bond the
carbons together to form a closed ring. The resulting molecule is
called a mono cyclic polyene.
Problems arise when we try to draw standard chemical bond
diagrams for these molecules. Forming one bond between each carbon
atom and its two adjacent neighbors still leaves one unpaired electron,
a pi electron, on each carbon. The pi electron can be used to form
additional bonds between carbons, but not in a unique way. For
example, with the well-known six carbon monocyclic polyene, the
benzene molecule, we find two apparently equivalent possibilities,
H
C
HC

H

=c

H

/

"- CH

~

~

C

H

-c

or

HC

4

H

c-c

~

CH

"- C =c /

H

H

H

This bonding ambiguity suggests that benzene may be unusual, and it
is. It is much more stable than chemists would have expected by
analogy with nonring molecules of similar composition. A theory of
the unusual stability of benzene was developed based on the bonding
ambiguity. The equivalent diagrams were called resonance structures;
and resonance theory postulated that the more of them you could
draw, the more stable the compound would be, relatively speaking.
Resonance theory broke down when applied to the five carbon
ring. This system has one electron that cannot be paired to form a
bond. Such a molecule is called a radical, and the unpaired electron is
usually indicated by a dot in the bond diagram. Since this electron
could be located on anyone of the five carbons, the cyclopentadienyl
radical has five resonance structures.
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Resonance theory then predicts unusual stability for this radical,
which experimentally it doesn't seem to have. However, if we add an
extra electron, forming the negatively charged cyclopentadienyl
anion, we do get a system of unusual stability. This is puzzling,
because the anion has the same number of resonance structures as the
radical,
/
HC

~

H
C

.. ,

e

/
CH

II

c - c

H

H

HC :

\

H
C

e

~

~
CH

I
c= c

H

HC

\

H

H
C

e

,
CH

It

etc.

c"- c

H

H

Furthermore, if we now remove both electrons, leaving a positively
charged "hole" on one carbon, we again get five , because the hole
could be on anyone of the carbons. Yet this species, the positively
charged cyclopentadienyl cation, is experimentally known to be very
unstable.
Note that both the cyclopentadienyl anion and benzene have six
pi electrons. The almost magical stability conferred by six pi electrons
was the source of the term "aromatic sextet" (aromatic because the
prototype, benzene, has a characteristic odor).
The mystery was solved by Erich Hiickel in a series of papers he
began publishing in 1931, only five years after Schrodinger. Hiickel
showed that a very crude application of the Schrodinger equation
predicted that those monocyclic polyenes with six pi electrons would,
be relatively the most stable . Due to many oversimplifications,
Hiickel's treatment did not constitute even an approximate solution of
the Schrodinger equation, in the sense to be discussed below. Nevertheless, he correctly showed that the pattern of stability displayed by
the molecules is inherently contained in the Schrodinger equation. In
fact , the pattern can be deduced almost entirely from symmetry considerations. Any symmetry of the molecular framework is preserved in
the hamiltonian. This places mathematical restrictions on the form of
the wavefunction, which ultimately appear in the behavior of the
molecule. These restrictions can be discovered with the mathematical
techniques of group theory. Group theory is the closest thing to getting
something for nothing in quantum mechanics, for by using it we can
learn something about the wavefunction without having to solve the
12

Schrodinger equation. Huckel's treatment took proper account of the
symmetry, so it gave the correct pattern. Refined versions of his
approach are being pursued today. The 1981 Nobel Prize in
Chemistry was awarded for work that built directly on the foundation
he established.
Huckel's work provided a qualitative understanding of what the
Schrodinger equation could tell us for some fairly complicated
molecules. At about the same time, others were attempting to understand what it could tell us quantitatively. They studied much simpler
systems than Huckel, but systems still far too complicated to be solved
exactly. Their approach was to develop and apply mathematically
sound methods for finding approximate solutions of the Schrodinger
equation.
There are many such methods, but they all share common
features that distinguish them from the Huckel approach and its
descendants. An approximate wavefunction of a certain form and
level of approximation is selected, but then no further approximations
are to be made. All subsequent computations are carried out as nearly
exactly as possible to yield unambiguous numerical predictions. These
methods are called ab initio methods. For some ab initio methods, it is
possible to prove convergence, which means that within the chosen
form , as the level of approximation is increased, the approximate
wavefunction must approach, or converge to, the exact one. Such
methods guarantee that we can obtain an answer of any desired accuracy simply by doing enough work. Unfortunately, for none of these
methods is it possible to specify in advance what is "enough," and
"enough" differs for different molecular properties. It also differs for
different methods applied to the same molecule or the same method
applied to different molecules. To top it off, experience has shown
that unless we are clever, "enough" is invariably "too much" for most
chemical problems.
The thing that prevents us from solving the Schrodinger equation
exactly for atoms and molecules is many electrons, where "many"
means "more than one. " The hydrogen atom, with one electron, can
be solved exactly. The helium atom and hydrogen molecule, both with
two, are already insoluble. Thus, it was deemed imperative to obtain
high-accuracy approximate solutions for these two systems if quantum
mechanics was to be taken seriously as the theory of atoms and
13

molecules. Such solutions were indeed obtained very early. Quite
sophisticated approximate wavefunctions were employed so that
"enough" might be achieved at a fairly low level-since it all had to be
done by hand. The calculations of E. A. Hylleraas on helium in 1929
and H . M. James and A. S. Coolidge on diatomic hydrogen in 1933
preceded the development of digital computers by more than a
decade.
The work of James and Coolidge was especially important for
chemistry because it demonstrated that quantum mechanics could
describe a typical chemical bond with high accuracy. Subsequent
calculations have carried their approach much further. The most
recent comparison between theory and experiment indicates that
quantum mechanics predicts the strength of the chemical bond in H2
to an accuracy of at least five parts in one hundred thousand. a
Although two electrons are a distinct advancement over one, it
still falls far short of all chemistry. Unfortunately, the special methods
developed by James and Coolidge for two electrons have proved nearly
impossible to generalize. The mathematical complications inherent in
their choice of approximate wavefunction are just too great, even with
computers. We need another way.
One possible way is to begin by asking, What makes the
Schrodinger equation for several electrons insoluble? The answer is
electron-electron interaction. Electrons are negatively charged; they
repel one another. If electrons were noninteracting, an exact solution
of the many-electron problem could be obtained by finding individual
wavefunctions for the individual electrons instead of having to find
one big wavefunction for all of them at once. A wavefunction for an
individual electron is called an orbital. Although orbitals can never
provide an exact solution for real interacting electrons, they might
provide a decent approximation.
It is very simple to find orbitals if we completely ignore the
electron-electron interaction. Unfortunately, that approximation is
too crude; it gives very poor predictions. A better approximation is to
account for as much of the interaction as possible. It isn't possible, of
course, to incorporate all effects due to interaction into orbitals; that
would be tantamount to an exact solution. It turns out that the most
we can do is include the average effects. An approximation in which
each orbital is allowed to adjust to the average repulsive interaction
14

produced by the electrons in all other orbitals is called a selfconsistentjield or SCF approximation.
I say "an" approximation rather than "the" approximation
because there are many SCF approximations. They differ in how
much freedom is permitted for the orbitals to adjust. The simplest
approximation is to retain as many features of orbitals for noninteracting electrons as possible. We may insist that the orbitals preserve
symmetry, meaning, for example, that if a particular orbital for
noninteracting electrons is spherical, it must remain spherical for
interacting electrons. We may also insist on using only the absolute
minimum number of orbitals. This is not one per electron but fewer
because two noninteracting electrons may be described by the same
orbital. A SCF approximation in which all these features of the
noninteracting electron problem are imposed as restrictions is called a
restricted SCF approximation. It provides the simplest description of a
many-electron system that at the same time accounts for as much
electron-electron interaction as possible.
It is not difficult to derive equations for restricted SCF orbitals,
and these equations are much simpler than the many-electron
Schrodinger equation. Even so, solving them is not easy, since each
orbital depends on all the others through the average interaction.
Although a surprising number of restricted SCF calculations on atoms
were performed by hand, principally by D. R. Hartree and coworkers,
the application of this approximation to molecules really had to await
the introduction of computers. Much of the pioneering work in the
development and computer implementation of methods for molecular
SCF calculations was carried out by C. C. J. Roothaan and his collaborators in the 1950s and 1960s. Today restricted SCF calculations
on molecules are as routine as any ab initio calculations are ever likely
to become. They have even been performed on the guanine-cytosine
base pair of DNA , a system with twenty-nine nuclei and one hundred
thirty-six electrons.
How good is the restricted SCF approximation? Qualitatively, it is
very good. It predicts the structure of the periodic table and the
relative strengths of most chemical bonds very well. In fact, the explanation of these two subjects that we present to our students in
freshman chemistry is based essentially on this approximation. Quantitatively, the best restricted SCF approximation is the one that puts
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no limitations on the adjustment of the orbitals other than those
already inherent in the definition of "restricted." Experience shows
that "a best restricted" SCF calculation will typically yield better than
ninety-eight percent of the total molecular energy for a small
molecule. Now a quantitative approximation with less than two percent error would be eminently satisfactory in many applications. But it
isn't necessarily good enough for chemistry.
To see why not, consider what we want to predict. We certainly
want to be able to predict chemical bonding. How would that be
done? Well, the most stable arrangements of any physical system are
those of lowest energy. If the energy of two atoms is lowered by bringing them close together, they will tend to remain close together. That
is what is meant by a bond. If, on the other hand, the energy is
increased, they will tend to fly apart. So the formation of a chemical
bond depends on the difference in energy between two atoms close
together and two atoms far apart. The magnitude of the energy difference is precisely the bond strength.
As an example, take diatomic fluorine , F 2. The best restricted
SCF total energy of two separated fluorine atoms is -198 .82 in convenient units called hartree, which need not concern us here. The energy
of the two atoms at a typical bond distance is -198 .77 in the same
units. The energy has increased (become more positive or less
negative) so the prediction is: no bond.
This prediction is somewhat embarrassing, for F2 is a well-known
molecule. Note that the two energies differ by only five in the fifth
figure or -0.05; on that tiny difference hinges the prediction. But, if
the restricted SCF approximation is only reliable to about two percent
of the total energy, the numbers we are subtracting are probably only
correct to about three figures at most. The residual error in the
restricted SCF approximation has completely invalidated the prediction .
This is not an isolated example. In fact , we now know that the
restricted SCF approximation is too simple an approximation to be
quantitatively satisfactory for chemistry. Unfortunately, it is only conceptually simple. Computationally, it is already fairly difficult to
apply, requiring extensive use of computers, etc. Doing better inevitably means doing even more work.
The most straightforward approach for doing better is what
might be called the "brute force approach." It is possible to prove that
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the restricted SCF approximation can be viewed as merely the first
level of approximation in anyone of a number of convergent approximate solution methods. The brute force approach says that if the first
level isn't sufficient, proceed to the second level, or to the third, or
however far it takes. Eventually, chemical bonding, or any other
phenomenon for that matter, must fall out.
The trouble with the brute force approach is that it appears to be
hopeless. Consider the F2 example. If differences in the fifth figure of
the total energy are the source of bonding, the level of approximation
must be increased until both total energies are accurate to better than
five figures . The fact that we cannot predict precisely what level that
will be is a minor problem, which can be solved with experience. The
major problem is that we are talking about at least one hundred times
more accuracy than the restricted SCF approximation. One must be
cautious in issuing pronouncements, but there seems to be no possibility in the foreseeable future of achieving this level of accuracy for any
but the smallest molecules. Even if it could be achieved, it wouldn't
suffice, for there are phenomena we want to predict that would
require yet more accuracy. Two neon atoms don't form a normal
chemical bond, but they do form a very weak van der Waals bond. To
predict that at all, we would need something like two hundred times
more accuracy still.
What do we really want? We don't want an exact solution of the
Schrodinger equation; we want to predict chemical phenomena. To
be sure, if we had an exact solution, we could make predictions, but
we would settle for any level of approximation that gave the same
predictions. Now it is clear that no approximation can reproduce all
the predictions of the exact solution, but for some specific
phenomenon it might be possible to devise a low level approximation
that gave correct predictions. Unfortunately, even if it is possible,
there are no straightforward mathematical techniques, no guaranteed
methods, to guide us. We have to fall back on intuitz"on.
Now falling back on intuition is admittedly a risky proposition.
The unreliability of our intuition in the atomic realm has already been
noted. Nevertheless, an intuitive approach seems to be the only way to
make significant progress, and significant progress is already being
made in just this way. Here is how intuition has been applied to the
problem of chemical bonding.
\
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The periodic table is periodic because different atoms may have
similar properties. Fluorine and chlorine have different numbers of
electrons (nine and seventeen respectively) but similar chemistry.
Therefore, not all of the electrons can be equally important in
chemical bonding. Of course, chemists have known this for a long
time; the concept of a covalent bond as a shared electron pair ignores
the other electrons. Chemists introduced the name valence electrons to
denote those electrons that appear to playa major role in bonding. To
translate these observations into quantum chemistry terms, it seems
reasonable to assume that only the valence electrons need to be
described accurately in order to predict bonding.
Again consider F2 • The fluorine atom has one unpaired electron,
so from the simplest viewpoint, F2 is held together by a single electron
pair covalent bond. The simplest step beyond restricted SCF then consists of increasing the level of approximation for just that pair. The
treatment of all (sixteen) other electrons remains at a restricted SCF
level. Now it c~n be shown that such treatment of the other electrons
undoubtedly introduces large errors. But the assumption is that if
these electrons are unimportant in bonding, whatever errors are committed in describing the behavior of these electrons will be the same
whether the two fluorine atoms are close together or far apart. When
the energy difference between the two arrangements of atoms is computed, these large errors should very nearly cancel out.
As a technical aside, let me indicate how the level of approximation for a pair of electrons can be increased. One very common
method is to describe the pair by more than the minimum number of
orbitals. To see how this works, suppose one electron is partially
described by an orbital that gives a high probability of finding the
electron say, in close to a nucleus. The other electron may at the same
time be described by orbitals, some of which give a high probability of
finding that electron far from the nucleus, hence far from the first
electron. In this way, electron-electron interaction within a pair can
be accounted for in detail, which is just a fancy way of saying that the
two electrons can be kept apart better.
Now to return to F2 and the crucial question: Can bonding be
obtained with a low level approximation? The answer is yes. IS Improving the description of the bonding pair by just one orbital beyond
restricted SCF leads to the prediction of a stable molecule. Quan18

titatively, however, the predicted bond strength is still pretty poorless than half of the experimental value. To do better, it is necessary to
realize that the fluorine atom really has five valence electrons. In addition to the unpaired electron, there are four others that behave
similarly. Indeed, all five are described by equivalent orbitals in the
restricted SCF approximation. Even though only one of them (the
unpaired one) is primarily involved in bonding, bond formation may
substantially alter the behavior of the other four; hence, errors in the
description of this behavior may not cancel out. If the level of approximation is increased for these electrons as well, a bond strength within
a few percent of experiment is obtained. Note that eight electrons are
still being described only at the restricted SCF level. And note
especially that the total energies are improved hardly at all ; they are'
still accurate only to about three figures. To reiterate, the only way
this approach can work is for the errors between the third and fifth
figures to cancel in taking the difference in energy between two atoms
far apart and two atoms close together. The actual calculations confirm our intuitive feeling that such cancellations can be built into a
carefully chosen, low level approximation.
A more difficult example is diatomic nitrogen, N 2 • The nitrogen
atom has three unpaired electrons, giving three electron pair bonds (a
triple bond) in the molecule. The level of approximation for all six
electrons must be increased in a mutually consistent way if the crucial
cancellation of errors is to arise. One of the most thorough applications of this approach to diatomic nitrogen predicted about eightyseven percent of the experimental bond strength. 16 So the approach
isn't perfect, but it does allow chemically relevant predictions to be
made in a finite amount of time with a finite amount of money.
The substitution of intuition for brute force can be applied in the
prediction of phenomena other than chemical bonding. A colleague
and I recently attempted to calculate the energy required to remove
the extra electron from the lithium hydride anion, LiH- Y Removing
the extra electron gives the neutral lithium hydride molecule, LiH, so
the removal energy is precisely the difference in total energy between
anion and neutral. The extra electron can exist in several states, and
for one state we computed an energy difference that was only about
one one-hundred-thousandth of the total energy of either molecule.
That is, the total energies only differed in the sixth figure; and at our
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level of approximation, neither total energy could be expected to be
accurate much beyond the second figure . Nevertheless, we were able
to obtain a (I hope) reliable difference by a judicious choice of
approximation, which insured maximum cancellation of error. How
good is our prediction? I don't know. No one has done an experimental measurement of the removal energy yet.
This leads naturally into my last topic, which is, Why do we care
what the Schrodinger equation is telling us? Is it mere intellectual
curiosity? No, there are compelling practical reasons. We want to
understand what the Schrodinger equation is telling us because that
information is useful. We may need to understand the behavior of
molecules in the upper atmosphere, interstellar space, or during an
explosion, perhaps. Many exotic molecules that exist in these environments are hard to study in the laboratory because duplicating the
extreme conditions of these environments is very difficult and expensive. If we could predict the behavior of these molecules, it would be
far less time consuming and much less expensive as well.
There are other cases when theoretical calculations appear to
provide not just an alternative method for obtaining the desired
answer but the only method. For example, in order for two molecules
to react with one another and form new molecules, they must be
brought close together. Usually, there is an energy barrier or "hill"
that must be surmounted before a reaction can occur. The late Henry
Eyring showed that from a knowledge of the height of this barrier, the
rate of reaction could be predicted. The rate of a reaction is very
important information, especially if we hope to use the reaction for
manufacturing purposes. Unfortunately, the top of an energy hill is
not a stable arrangement of the atoms. Consequently, it is very hard to
conceive of a direct experimental method for determining the barrier
height. Of course, if we measured the rate, we might be able to work
backward to get the barrier height, but the rate is what we want to
predict. Fortunately, the Schrodinger equation can be used to predict
the energy of an unstable arrangement of atoms just as well as a stable
one. There seems to be no experimental alternative in this case.
Not all attempts to understand what the Schrodinger equation is
telling us are motivated by such practical considerations. Many
attempts are indeed made for the sole purpose of satisfying mere intellectual curiosity. The use of "mere" in this context has decidely
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negative connotations. In this era of economic hardship and shrinking
research budgets, the value of such research may seem questionable.
But attempting to understand what the Schr6dinger equation is telling
us is really a way of asking, What is the world like? We believe that the
Schrodinger equation is the rule of behavior of an atom, and we
. believe that atoms are the basic building blocks of the world.
Therefore, it seems to me that we ought to attempt to find out what
the Schrodinger equation has to say for the same reason that we would
seek the counsel of a wise and respected, but rather cryptic,
philosopher, or religious leader, or poet. What is the world like? seems
to be a fundamental human question. I'm no anthropologist, but I
would guess that almost all cultures have belief systems that attempt to
supply answers to that question. In our culture, science is one such
belief system, and trying to understand what the Schrodinger equation
is telling us is part of the ritual.
Nevertheless, the Schrodinger equation isn't dogma , not even for
chemistry. If it ever fails to predict the behavior of chemical
phenomena , it can and will be replaced. We don't believe this is likely
to happen at any time in the near future , but it might, and some years
from now another theoretical chemist may be presenting an honor lecture about understanding what the strange new rules of chemistry are
telling us . If so , the introduction of the lecture is sure to contain a section harking back nostalgically to the good old days of 1982 when the
rules of chemistry were as simple as

A'V=~ c3'V
2n c3t
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